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ABSTRACT: In this paper I investigate what role the stylistic device of hyperbole can play in arguers’ 
strategic maneuvers in the argumentation stage of a discussion. First, I give an analysis of the general 
effects the use of hyperbole may have in argumentative discourse. Next, I specify how hyperbole may 
contribute to arguers’ dialectical and rhetorical aims in the argumentation stage of a discussion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Hyperbole is a rhetorical trope by means of which statements are made that are 
obviously exaggerated and thus untrue or unwarranted.1 In this paper, this stylistic 
device will be discussed by making use of the extended version of the pragma-
dialectical argumentation theory, in which rhetorical insights are integrated in a 
dialectical framework (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 9; van Eemeren, 2010, p. 
22). According to this theory, arguers may be taken to be pursuing both dialectical 
and rhetorical goals in argumentative discourse. Although the rhetorical norm of 
persuasion is not necessarily in contradiction with the critical ideal of 
reasonableness, there is a potential tension between attempting to achieve a 
dialectical as well as a rhetorical aim (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 135). In 
order to diminish this tension, arguers are assumed to make use of ‘strategic 
manoeuvring’. Strategic manoeuvring consists of three aspects: making an 
expedient choice from the topical potential, adapting to the audience, and making 
use of appropriate presentational devices.2 Strategic manoeuvring can ‘derail’ and 
become fallacious if a party allows its dialectical aims to be overruled by its 
rhetorical aims, and violates one or more rules for critical discussion.  
In the last couple of years I have explored the possibilities for strategic 
manoeuvring with various presentational means such as metonymy, rhetorical 
questions and praeteritio.3 In this paper I will investigate what role the stylistic 
                                                        
1 In classical rhetoric, hyperbole can also be a figure of thought, when it is a means of gradual 
amplification (Lausberg, 1998, p. 410). 
2 These aspects are to a large extent comparable with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) 
notions of ‘choice’, ‘communion’ and ‘presence’. 
3 See Snoeck Henkemans (2008, 2009a, and 2009b). 
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device of hyperbole can play in arguers’ attempts to reconcile their rhetorical with 
their dialectical aims in the argumentation stage of a discussion. I shall first give an 
analysis of the general effects hyperbole may have in argumentative discourse. Next, 
I shall give a specification of the role hyperbole may play in arguer’s strategic 
manoeuvres in the argumentation stage. Finally, I shall shed some light on the 
question which derailments of strategic manoeuvring may typically occur when 
hyperbole is used in the argumentation stage of a discussion. 
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF HYPERBOLE  
 
Quintilian (VIII.6.67) describes hyperbole as a “tasteful exaggeration of the truth” 
that can go in two directions: one can exaggerate by presenting things as bigger or 
as smaller than they are. In this paper I will concentrate on the first type of 
hyperbole, the exaggerated enlargement. 
Overstatement can take various forms: the lexico-grammatical repertoire for 
hyperbole includes numerical expressions, expressions of spatial extent, 
intensifying and extreme adjectives and adverbs, comparatives and superlatives 
(Spitzbardt 1963). According to McCarthy and Carter hyperbolic utterances often 
describe entities and events in the most extreme way possible (2004, p. 157). They 
contain lexical items such as completely, every time, and everyone.4 Claridge (2011, 
pp. 40-49) gives an overview of realizations of hyperbole. A first distinction that can 
be made is that between basic and composite hyperbole. Basic hyperbolic 
expressions are non-metaphorical, such as (1). Composite hyperboles, such as the 
expression ‘petrified’ in example (2) are not just hyperbolic, but metaphorical as 
well (Claridge, 2011, pp. 40-41): 
 
(1) It was so cold in the restaurant I was freezing. 
 
(2) When I saw him walking down the street I was petrified. 
 
Hyperbolic expressions can be words (as in example 1 and 2), phrases or clauses. 
Within the categories of phrasal and clausal hyperboles, there are two regularly 
occurring patterns: comparison, as in example (3), and repetition, as in example (4) 
(Claridge, 2011, p. 48).5 
 
(3) I avoid beaches like the plague. 
 
(4) He put loads and loads of cream on his cake. 
 
                                                        
4 McCarthy and Carter (2004, p. 157) perceive an overlap between what Pomerantz (1986) has 
termed ‘extreme case formulations’ and hyperbole, although they do recognize that extreme 
formulations are not necessarily heard as counterfactual and are often rather conventional.  
5 Apart from with metaphor, hyperbole may also be combined with other tropes and figures, such as 
for instance rhetorical questions and irony. An example of a combination of hyperbole and irony 
could be: “He managed not to spill any egg on his shirt. A heroic feat”. 
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Although hyperbole exaggerates how things are in reality, and thus involves saying 
something which is strictly speaking untrue, or unwarranted, it is not considered as 
a form of lying.6 According to Clark, hyperbole can be seen as a violation of the 
maxim of quality which gives rise to conversational implicatures (1996, p. 143). 
That the literal utterance violates the maxim of quality is a property that hyperbole 
shares with a figure of speech such as irony. There is, however an important 
difference between the reconstruction of the intended meaning in cases of irony and 
hyperbole, according to McCarthy and Carter (2004, p. 158). In recovering the 
intended meaning of an ironic statement, the listener should change the literal 
assertion into a different kind of assertion (usually the opposite of what was literally 
said). In the case of hyperbole, however, the difference between what is said and 
what is implicated is  
 
not one of kind, but of degree; the corrective response is to up- or downscale the 
assertion to accord with reality  
 
McCarthy and Carter give as an example: the listener who hears I almost starved to 
death when I stayed at my aunt’s house! ‘corrects’ it to something like My aunt was 
very mean with food/did not feed me nearly enough so I was hungry (2004, p. 158). 
Since hyperbole can only be recognized if the listener notes that there is a 
distinction between what is literally said and what is actually the case, the role of 
context is crucial in the interpretation of hyperbolic utterances (Claridge, 2011, p. 
12). What is an exaggeration in the one case, does not have to be one in the other.  
The question is to what exactly a speaker can be held accountable in the case 
of hyperbole. Fogelin (1988, p. 13) believes that an hyperbolic statement is uttered 
‘with the intention of having it corrected away from the extreme, but still to 
something strong’.7 According to Claridge (2011, p. 20), by using hyperbole, 
speakers communicate their emotional orientation towards a state of affairs. This is 
possible, because hyperbolic expressions do not just have a quantitative meaning, 
but also a qualitative or emotional value: 
 
While hyperbole is one means of intensification in the sense of gradability, [….] it is 
also intensification in the emotional sense, i.e. emphasis or what Labov (1984) calls 
‘intensity’. Emphasis as such is not dependent on a degree scale, but generally 
heightens the force of the proposition and marks the intensity of speaker 
involvement and commitment. This means that while the speaker is certainly not 
bound to the literal meaning of his utterance, s/he is committed to the deeper 
emotional and interactional, thus social, truth of the statement. (Claridge, 2011, 
p.12) 
 
                                                        
6 Not just factual assertions may be hyperbolic: Claridge (2011, p. 19, 17n) gives examples of 
evaluative statements (such as: “I love that passport”) that can be exaggerated too. In that case, the 
hyperbole is not counterfactual, but the utterance is less credible, does not seem completely sincere. 
7 According to Norrick, by using hyperbole the speaker communicates ‘that his utterance seems to 
him to literally represent the objective state of affairs, given his emotional involvement’ (Norrick, 
1982, p. 172). 
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Claridge adds that one of the characteristics of hyperbole is that it can at the same 
time emphasize something and convey emotions. Although emotions are important 
in the case of hyperbole, and the trope is therefore often associated with pathos in 
particular,8 Claridge argues that this trope can have an influence on all of the three 
Aristotelian aspects of persuasion, logos, pathos and ethos:  
 
With respect to logos, it can be useful to maximize or hyperbolically inflate some 
aspects of proofs while downplaying others […] With respect to pathos, hyperbole 
can make things appear more important, more frightening or more desirable, thus 
arousing specific attitudes and feelings. […] Finally, with respect to ethos, a 
constantly exaggerating speaker may appear untrustworthy […] while one who 
always minimizes may not be convincing, or boring; the degree of hyperbole may 
need to be carefully calibrated. (Claridge 2011, p. 217) 
 
In classical rhetoric, hyperbole and other forms of amplification were already seen 
as techniques that can be used to exaggerate certain facts or value judgements and 
thereby strengthen the arguer’s defence or attack.9 Fahnestock and Tonnard 
describe the function ascribed to such techniques throughout the history of rhetoric 
as that of making a line of argument “more psychologically salient to the audience 
and more conceptually important in the overall case” (2011, p. 105).  
In a corpus study analysis of the rhetorical functions of hyperbole in ordinary 
conversations, Cano Mora found that many hyperbolic utterances were used on the 
one hand to praise someone or to approve of something and on the other to 
complain, attack and criticize someone or something (2006, p. 205).10 A similar 
observation is made by Claridge, who found that particularly in a political context 
hyperbole is used for such purposes as “emphasising the seriousness of the 
situation, the urgency of action, criticising the political opponent and praising one’s 
own party or policies” (2011, p. 265). 
Claridge (2011, p. 209) mentions another aspect of hyperbole that may be 
used for persuasive purposes: many hyperbolic expressions are characterized by a 
certain vagueness. When expressions such as ‘age’ or ‘load’ or ‘million’ are used 
hyperbolically, they do not refer to an exact amount. This vagueness may, according 
to her, be to the advantage of the speaker. 
 
3. THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION OF HYPERBOLE IN THE ARGUMENTATION STAGE 
 
From the discussion of the literature on hyperbole it has become clear that 
hyperbole can function as an emphasizing device and can therefore be used to make 
information that is to the arguer’s advantage seem more salient to the audience. 
Hyperbole also has an evaluative meaning, which makes it a suitable instrument to 
                                                        
8 Hyperbole has been classified as a figure of affect in rhetoric (Lausberg, 1960, p. 299) 
9 Such a role is given to hyperbole and amplification in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, in the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, and in Cicero’s De Oratore. 
10 Cano Mora found that emphasis was by far the most important function of hyperbole, followed by 
positive and negative evaluation. Other more or less prominent functions were expression of 
surprise, simplification, interest intensification, contrast of differences and humour (2006, p. 199). 
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convey and arouse emotions. The combination of the emphasizing and evaluative 
effect of hyperbole explains why this device is particularly suitable for acts of 
criticism or praise. Finally, since many hyperbolic expressions possess a certain 
vagueness, they may be used by speakers as a way of avoiding to commit themselves 
to a precise specification of quantity or size. 
The question I would now like to address is what role hyperbole, in view of 
these characteristics, can play in arguers’ strategic manoeuvrings in the 
argumentation stage of an argumentative discussion. The dialectical aim of the 
argumentation stage is to advance argumentation for one’s own point of view and to 
criticize the other party’s argumentation. The rhetorical aim of this stage is “to make 
the strongest case and to launch the most effective attack” (van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 2002, p. 139). In order to make a strong case, arguers will attempt to 
present their arguments in such a way that they seem as strong as possible.  
Hyperbole can contribute to this aim by amplifying important aspects of the 
arguer’s argumentation so that they look more forceful. An example is the 
exaggeration of positive qualities of a product often found in commercial 
advertisements, such as example (5). If the fact that coffee made of freshly ground 
coffee beans tastes good could be an argument for ordering a certain brand of coffee 
beans, then the hyperbolic “nothing tastes better than” can be seen as a stronger 
argument:11 
 
(5) Nothing tastes better than a lovely cup of coffee made of freshly 
ground coffee beans. At mycoffebeansshop.nl you will find an 
excellent selection of coffee beans of high quality [Translation fsh]. 
(http://jesite.info/koffie-zoals-u-nooit-eerder-geproefd-hebt/) 
 
Another way of making a strong case in the argumentation stage is presenting the 
arguments in such a way that they become more difficult to attack. In particular 
numerical hyperbolic statements may be used as a kind of proof that is vague and 
unverifiable (Claridge, 2011, pp. 192-193). The arguer of example (6) - an 
advertisement for manuals and courses to improve your thinking - cannot be held 
committed to the literal meaning of “hundreds of thousands”, but it is not exactly 
clear what he can be considered committed to: 
 
(6) Special techniques exist that you can use to improve your thinking. 
[…] This kind of thinking, parallel and lateral, has to become a habit. 
The methods work – however, just like posture, they only work if we 
stick to them strictly! Hundreds of thousands of people can confirm this. 
(http://www.council4newthinking.com/) 
 
Hyperbole can also be used in the argumentation stage to make an attack on the 
other party’s argumentation seem more forceful. In example (7) the British Prime 
                                                        
11 Claridge mentions three types of scales involved in hyperbole, one of which is a scale based on the 
ranking of argumentative strength: “saying it is freezing is a more convincing argument for putting 
on a winter coat, scarf and gloves than saying it is cold or cool” (2011, pp. 8-9). 
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Minister David Cameron reacts to the accusation of the Leader of the Opposition, 
Edward Miliband, that the government’s policies show that Cameron is out of touch 
with the situation of lower and middle class families, while his policies are favouring 
the rich. Cameron denies the charge, by claiming that he has cut taxes for the poor, 
and that under his government the rich pay more taxes than in the past under the 
opposition. Miliband then attacks Cameron by claiming that nobody believes him 
anymore and that everyone knows that he only represents the rich: 
 
(7) The Prime Minister: What is out of touch is denying the fact that we 
had a deficit left by the right hon. Gentleman’s Government that we 
had to deal with. That is what we have had to do, but we have been 
able to do it at the same time as cutting taxes for the poorest in our 
country, increasing child tax credits, and freezing the council tax to 
help those families. When it comes to the top rate of tax, let me tell 
him this: the richest in our country will pay more in tax under every 
year of this Government than any year of his Government. Those are 
the facts; he may not like them but he cannot deny them. 
Edward Miliband: The problem is that nobody believes him anymore. 
[…] Before he was elected, the Prime Minister said: “Unless you can 
represent everyone in our country you cannot be a one nation party.” 
That was then; this is now. Everyone now knows he cannot be a one 
nation Prime Minister. 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/c
m121219/debtext/121219-0001.htm#12121957001143) 
 
By reacting in this way, Miliband implicitly argues that the “facts” that the Prime 
Minister is referring to cannot really be seen as undeniable facts, since “nobody 
believes him anymore”. In his attack, Miliband does not really address Cameron’s 
arguments for the opposite standpoint: he does not show that Cameron did not cut 
taxes for poor families or that it is not true that the rich will pay more taxes under 
his Government. Instead, Miliband makes it seem as if there is general agreement on 
the fact that David Cameron is not doing anything for the poor, but is only favouring 
the rich. To make his attack seem stronger – if only in the eyes of a third party, the 
voters Miliband represents – Miliband makes use of the hyperbolic expressions 
“nobody” and “everyone”. 
When criticizing an opponent’s argument, hyperbole can also be used to 
maximize the opponent’s burden of proof, so that a defence against the criticism 
becomes more difficult. One particular way of doing this is to magnify a missing 
premiss in the other party’s argumentation. That is what Pollywolly seems to do in 
her reaction to Lizzi in example (8): 
 
(8) Lizzi: Heard about Billy Joel's car crash? Slammed his merc into a tree 
Saturday night, airlifted to hospital and later released. And guess what? He 
wasn't breathalysed. Must be great to be a millionaire round here... :roll:  
Pollywolly: So you think that EVERYONE involved in a car crash should be 
breathalysed? Why? 
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 (http://www.british-expats.com/thread-4921.html) 
 
Lizzi defends the implicit standpoint that millionaire and pop singer Billy Joel 
should have been breathalysed, since he crashed his car by driving it into a tree. In 
her attack, Pollywolly makes explicit what she considers to be the missing premise 
that Lizzi can be held committed to: “Everyone involved in a car crash should be 
breathalysed.” That seems rather an exaggerated premise to ascribe to Lizzi. Firstly, 
because the word “involved” could be taken to mean that not just the driver, but also 
the passengers should be breathalysed. Secondly, it may have been the specific 
circumstances of the crash that are the reason for Lizzi to argue that the driver 
should have been breathalysed. A more reasonable interpretation of the implicit 
premise intended by Lizzie would probably be: “Anyone involved as a driver in a car 
crash in such circumstances should be breathalysed”. That there is a more 
reasonable interpretation is – jokingly – pointed out by one of the other participants 
on the Web forum, Pilgrim 007 (example 9): 
 
(9) Pilgrim 007: Hmmm - let's see....single car, no others involved, hit a tree 
which last time I checked were off to the side of the area reserved for cars 
(that's the black bit with the yellow lines down the middle for the hard of 
thinking amongst us). I'd say a breathalyser test would be in order :wink: 
 (http://www.british-expats.com/thread-4921.html) 
 
4. HYPERBOLE AND FALLACIES 
 
Although exaggerating involves saying something which is strictly speaking not true, 
or not warranted, this fact in itself does not make the use of hyperbole fallacious. In 
the pragma-dialectical approach, the requirement is only that the arguer should 
commit himself (if only for the time being) to the assertions that he puts forward 
and thus accept responsibility for them, not that he should believe those assertions 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 32).12 Also, as we have seen, hyperbole is a 
form of indirect language use, which means that the arguer cannot be held 
committed to the literal speech act. This may, however, make it difficult in some 
cases to establish to what exactly the arguer can be held committed.  
Even though exaggerating in itself is not fallacious, there are a number of 
uses to which hyperbole might be put which could lead to derailments of strategic 
manoeuvring and thus to particular fallacies. One example is the fallacy of the straw 
man, which can be committed when an arguer distorts the other party’s standpoint 
by means of an unwarranted generalization, a technique which generally requires 
the use of hyperbolic expressions. It is not just the other party’s standpoint that may 
be distorted by means of exaggeration, but also, as we have seen in the car crash 
example (8), an unexpressed premise in the other party’s argument that may be 
blown up by the opponent only to make it easier to attack.  
                                                        
12 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 32, 155) explain that requiring the arguer to be 
responsible for what he has said, at least for the duration of the discussion, instead of sincere, is 
necessary to allow for cases such as hypothetical reasoning and reductio ad absurdum. 
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Hyperbole can also be used to exaggerate the number of people who agree on 
some issue, so that an argument can be presented as an undeniable fact or starting 
point. This can be a strategy to evade the burden of proof. In example (7), the 
antagonist uses this strategy in his attack of the Prime Minister’s arguments. Since 
he does in fact not refute the Prime Minister’s arguments, his attack could also be 
seen as an example of irrelevant argumentation for his own point of view. 
Finally, as is shown by the vague reference to large numbers of people who 
could confirm the arguer’s standpoint in example (6), the use of hyperbole can in 
some cases be problematic because of its vagueness, which can lead to committing 
fallacies such as misusing unclearness, or immunizing one’s arguments against 
criticism.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
As I hope to have made clear by presenting a number of examples of the use of 
hyperbole, this stylistic device can be used for different rhetorical purposes in the 
argumentation stage of an argumentative discussion. Generally speaking, hyperbole 
can be used to emphasize the information that contributes most to achieving the 
arguer’s aims in the stage concerned. In the argumentation stage the arguer’s 
arguments can be made to look stronger by means of exaggeration. Also, criticism 
can be put forward in a more forceful way, either by ascribing more to an arguer 
than he can be held committed to, or by exaggerating the criticism in such a way that 
it becomes more difficult for those that are attacked to defend themselves against 
the criticism. 
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